Abstract
Introduction
The global economic and financial crisis that started with the bursting of the housing bubbles in the United States led to general concern about credit quality in the advanced economies, unanticipated contagion to other financial assets and a sharp retrenchment of credit to various sectors and economic agents. The crisis affected advanced economies, emerging markets and developing countries in very different ways (see Chudik and Fratzscher, 2011) . Advanced economies were first hit mainly by the systemic banking crisis in the United States and Europe. Emerging markets with well-developed financial systems were initially mostly affected by cross-border financial linkages through capital flows and exchange rates. In developing countries of which most of the sub-Saharan African countries belong to, the effects on real factors such as trade, tourism, workers' remittances, and official development assistance dominated.
The previous studies have mainly focused on the effects of the financial crisis on the advanced and emerging market economies (see, for instance, Dooley and Hutchison, 2009; Claessens et al., 2010) . Even though there are studies exploring the impacts of the financial crisis on the sub-Saharan African economies, some of the impacts are reported based on the estimated or expected data during the period of the crisis [see, for example, Massa and Velde, 2008; African Development Bank (ADB), 2009; Arief et al., 2009] . Hence, there is still room for further study of the financial crisis, especially from the perspective of developing economies with the recent data obtained from various reliable sources. Our aim is to therefore explore the direct financial transmission and indirect real channels of the financial crisis and to explore its effect on sub-Saharan African countries. Over the past decade, sub-Saharan Africa has made remarkable gains in promoting growth with economic stability. Real GDP growth averaged 5.9 percent over the period of 2004 to 2008; inflation had fallen to singledigit levels before the fuel and food prices shock of 2008 and reserves were accumulated [see International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2009a] . These positive developments relied on effective economic policies, a favourable external environment, debt relief and foreign aid. However, these hard-won economic gains are being threatened. Relatively weak financial linkages with advanced economies have not shielded African countries from the global economic storm. Demand for African exports has fallen, commodity prices have declined and workers' remittance flows are weakening. The tightening of global credit conditions is reducing foreign direct investment and reversing portfolio flows, making trade finance more costly. The economic slowdown also increases credit risk and non-performing assets, weakening the balance sheets of financial institutions and corporations.
In the next section, an overview of how sub-Saharan African countries are exposed to the crisis through the direct financial transmission channels is provided, with the critical assessment on the impacts on different economies. Section 3 explores the indirect real transmission channel of the crisis and how the sub-Saharan African economies are impacted by it. Inter alia, these two sections provide detailed exploration of the spillover effects of the crisis on the sub-Saharan African countries, in addition to identifying their sources. Since the financial systems in the sub-Saharan African countries are so heterogeneous, their exposure to the crisis varies greatly. The focus is therefore more on highlighting those countries being mostly affected by a particular channel. The last section provide a conclusion as well as point out some policy implications.
Direct Transmission Channels
When the financial crisis broke out in 2007, there was a general perception that sub-Saharan African countries would only be affected in a limited extent, due to the limited exposure to the developed financial systems in the United States and other European countries (see ADB, 2009) . Indeed, African countries have been adversely affected by the crisis in both direct and indirect ways. In this section, we explore three direct transmission channels due to the direct exposure to the international financial systems. They include the effects through capital markets, banking sector, and private capital flows.
Capital markets
Before we explore the effects of the capital markets on sub-Saharan African countries, it is important to know that these countries are so heterogeneous that their exposure to the crisis varies greatly. In terms of financial depth and the degree of capital and financial market development, there are three distinct groups. These are: emerging market group, frontier market group, and financially developing group 1 (see IMF, 2009a) . In this section, we are
In bonds markets, several sub-Saharan African countries came under intense pressure as the liquidity in global credit markets declined. For instance, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia registered significant outflows from their domestic debt markets. In addition, unfavourable capital market condition also led several countries to postpone their bond issuance plans (see Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011) . For example, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania postponed their bond issuance plans due to the increased risk premia resulted from the financial crisis (Kasekende et al., 2009 ). In the case of South Africa, although she did not heavily rely on international borrowing, she was affected by the increase in sovereign spreads. Such increase reflected the investor liquidity needs and flights to higher quality assets (IMF, 2009a) . Table 1 On the foreign exchange markets, the exchange rate in the region 2 was under pressure due to the portfolio outflows triggered by increased risk aversion and deleveraging, sharp declines in foreign direct investment, and the unwinding of commodity trade. In particular, the currencies of the relatively open economies such as Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia came under some pressure and depreciated against the dollar (see IMF, 2009a; 2009b) . Such exchange rate depreciation pressure and volatility had been persistent for some time because of various factors. They included the highly uncertain pace of global recovery, geographical rebalancing of trade flows, and volatility in the exchange rates of the main currencies. As a result of the continued exchange rate volatility, it posted particular challenges for countries seeking to integrate with international capital markets. Literature suggests that financial integration may act as a catalyst for economic growth, which facilitates more rapid investment in infrastructure and private sector development, enhances competition, and encourages foreign direct investment and technology transfer (see for example, Eichengreen et al, 1998; Agénor, 2003) . However, increased exchange rate volatility could hinder financial integration, skewing capital flows from longer-term to shortterm investment, thereby affecting economic growth in the region.
Banking sector
Banking sector is generally considered to be a major channel through which the direct impacts of the financial and economic crisis would be transmitted through the cross-border activities between banks. The crisis could cause a decline in international bank lending, which might lead to bank failures and credit tightening (Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011) . In the case of sub-Saharan African countries, financial institutions were relatively resilient due to a number of factors. For instance, studies suggest that most African banks had limited exposure to the sub-prime mortgage market and asset-backed securities [see Massa and Velde, 2008 ; United Nations Economic and Social Council/Economic Commission for Africa/African Union Commission (UNESC/ECA/AUC), 2009]. In addition, African banking systems in general had limited exposure to complex financial instruments. This resulted in fewer exposures and risks of potential losses (Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011) . In fact, the banking systems in the region were characterised by abundant low-cost domestic deposits and liquidity. This allowed banks to finance themselves with domestic funds. Furthermore, the existence of capital control in several countries, such as Nigeria, Ghana, helped to moderate the direct and indirect effects of the crisis on the banking systems (IMF, 2009a) .
Despite the impact of crisis on the banking sector was limited, the banks' flow of credit to the private sector declined in most countries (see Ackah et al., 2009 ). For example, in Ghana, there was a continuous tightening of credit conditions for enterprises since December 2008. The credit to household for property purchase also declined significantly in the last quarter of 2008 (Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011) . In the case of Kenya, the growth of the banks' flow of credit to the private sector declined from 7.4 percent in the third quarter of 2008 to 2.5 percent in the last quarter of the same year (Aryeetey, 2009) . The decline in credit flow to private sector appears to be quite similar for many other African countries. As a result of the credit tightening, many of the SMEs and household will be affected (Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011) .
In addition, countries that have significant foreign banking ownership in the banking systems might be adversely affected by the crisis in threefold: (i) parent banks might be less willing to provide liquidity to their African subsidiaries; (ii) parent banks might be tempted to withdraw funds from their African subsidiaries in order to offset losses in home countries; and (iii) parent banks might be unwilling or unable to inject additional needed capital into African subsidiaries. All these will increase African banks' chances for bankruptcy (see Ackah et al., 2009 , IMF 2009a . Table 2 shows the African countries with concentrated foreign banking assets in 2008. As indicated in Table 2 , the majority of banking assets in the African banks were foreign-owned, which were vulnerable to the banking crisis experienced in their parent banks. 
Foreign direct investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been regarded as an important engine of economic growth in Africa recently. In particular, the FDI inflows to tourism or traditional manufacturing sectors promote domestic employment, consumption and economic growth (see Bonassi et al., 2006; Allen and Giovannetti, 2011) . Unlike other developing countries, FDI to the region is unevenly distributed across countries and highly concentrated in the countries with rich natural resource endowment (Allen and Giovannetti, 2011) . For instance, four resource rich countries, namely, Angola, Chad, Nigeria and Sudan had accounted for 70 percent of the total FDI during the period of 2000 to 2005 (OECD, 2008 . In the early 2008, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, and Nigeria, each attracted more than US$1 billion FDI inflows in their countries. However, due to the financial crisis, credit was tightened and the profits were lowered in the firms of the developed countries. As a result, they might need to downsize their investment plans and adopted a wait-and-see attitude.
There were a number of cancellations and postponements in the investment in natural resources and manufacturing in the region. For example, the mining projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia were cancelled while the mining projects in Botswana and Tanzania were postponed. Also, the refinery project in Sudan was postponed (ADB, 2010).
Despite there were a number of cancellations and postponements in the investment projects, the impact of reduced FDI in the region was mild compared with other developing countries. It was because most of the FDI inflows were concentrated in natural resource sectors. Even the new projects might be delayed but most ongoing projects would likely to be continued. It was mainly due to the consideration of sizable up-front capital investment required for such investment and losses associated with withdrawing from natural resource projects prior to their completion. As a result, the likelihood of FDI withdrawal was reduced (IMF, 2009a) . Some studies even argued that financial crisis might increase FDI inflows to the region. It was because tough economic conditions might offer opportunity to buy assets at a "bargain prices". It also offered a good chance to some industries such as automotive, financial services, metal mining, and oil and gas, to increase their operation scales [ , 2016) . The impressive growth of FDI was mainly due to the fact that investment in the region offered diversification opportunities, and relatively higher return rates than those in mature economies (Massa and Velde, 2008) . When we consider the reduction of net FDI inflows to the region due to the financial crisis, the impact was relatively mild and not persistent. The net FDI inflows dropped from US$34.57 billion in 2008 to US$25.33 billion in 2009. However, it immediately increased to US$39.15 billion in 2010, which was a record high level in 2010s (WDI, 2016) . Figure 1 shows the trend of net FDI inflows to sub-Saharan African countries during the period of 2000 to 2011. Source: Author's compilation based on WDI (2016).
Portfolio investment
In addition to the foreign direct investment, portfolio investment to the region was adversely affected by the financial crisis. During the past decade, some stock exchanges in the region such as the ones in Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria and Uganda, had experienced an extraordinary performance, thereby attracting an increasing share of portfolio inflows (Massa and Velde, 2008) . For instance, the net portfolio inflows to the region increased from US$4.2 billion in 2000 to US$16.81 billion in 2006 (WDI, 2016). However, the financial crisis put the portfolio investment in the region at risk due to various reasons. They included: the heightened risk aversion of investors; the tightening of global credit conditions; the deterioration of the macroeconomic environment in the region; and the increased volatility of capital markets and exchange rates. All these factors had led to a reduction of portfolio inflows to sub-Saharan Africa (Massa and Velde, 2008) . The effect was more serious in the countries with developed stock market. For example, in South Africa, about US$1 billion in portfolio investment left the country during the third quarter of 2008. This situation continued to be worsening with about US$5.7 billion in portfolio investment outflows during the fourth Source: Author's compilation based on WDI (2016). 
Indirect Real Transmission Channels
The global economic and financial crisis has spilled over from the financial economies to the real economies, leading to serious negative impacts on the real sector of the economies. There are a number of important transmission channels which the crisis can affect sub-Saharan African countries. In the study, we mainly focus on trade, tourism, workers' remittances, and official development assistance.
Trade
Many of the sub-Saharan African countries rely on exports markets as their engines for economic growth. Some studies suggested that trade was considered to be the most important crisis transmission for the region (see, for example, ODI, 2010; Berman and Martin, 2012) . There are two mechanisms through which a financial crisis in the developed countries can affect the export of other countries. The first one is the income effect due to the sharp economic recession brought by the crisis. The second one is the disruption effect in the form of fall in trade finance (Berman and Martin, 2012) . In the case of the sub-Saharan African countries, Berman and Martin (2012) found that African exports were more sensitive to large decline in income of their trading partners. They also found that the disruptive effect was more severe and long lasting for African countries than the exporters of other regions.
Due to these two transmission mechanisms, there was a sharp decline in export prices and also trade volumes. Before the outbreak of the crisis, countries whom were oil rich and agriculture net exporters benefited from increase in fuel and food prices Perhaps, based on the historical data, one can argue that the transmission through trade was important but not as long lasting as other studies suggested. 
Tourism
International tourism receipts are important sources of revenue to the region. They account for about 4 percent of GDP of 29 sub-Saharan African countries, such as Cape Verde, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Tanzania, among others. Due to the financial crisis, countries which relied on tourism were negatively affected by the decline in tourists and the associated fall in foreign exchange earnings. It was evident that the growth rate of international tourist arrivals to the region declined from 7. (UNWTO, 2009b) . Moreover, the slowdown in tourist arrivals might spread to other related services sector such as hotels, and restaurants (Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011) .
Workers' remittances
Remittance flows to sub-Saharan Africa have experienced a significant growth recently, which serve as a powerful poverty reduction mechanism in the region. It increased from a value of US$3.2 billion in 1995 to US$25.9 billion in 2007, in which about 80 percent of its remittances came from advanced countries (see IMF, 2009a; WDI, 2016) . The potential impact of the financial turmoil on remittent flows on the developing countries has been a matter of debate since the onset of the financial crisis. Some argue that the crisis would lead to a decline in the remittent flows. It is because the workers whom work in the worsening macroeconomic condition in the developed countries would find it difficult to send the same When we consider the importance of remittent inflows in sub-Saharan Africa, we find that the region is dependent on remittances. According to the calculation from the World Bank (2009), about 2.5 percent of regional GDP came from remittances. In particular, remittances accounted for more than 20 percent of GDP in Comoros and Lesotho. Also, there were ten other countries, which remittent inflows accounted for more than 5 percent of GDP. Figure 6 show top 25 recipients of personal remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2008. Figure 7 shows the impact of crisis on personal remittances in top five recipients' countries. It shows that countries such as Lesotho, Togo and Nigeria were hard hit by the financial crisis through the channel of remittent inflows. 2008). In the low-income sub-Saharan African countries, official aid flows accounted for an average of 70 percent of resource flows over the past decade. In the middle-income subSaharan African countries, it accounted for an average of 30 percent of resource flows during the same period (see Ratha et al. 2008) . Therefore, many countries in the region were vulnerable to the downturn of official aid flows.
Some studies argued that the downturn of official aid flows was likely to happen after the financial crisis. It was because the developed donor countries, which experienced adverse macroeconomic conditions, need to finance billions on financial sector bailouts and their fiscal stimulus packages to sustain internal demand. As a result, they might be less likely to honor their commitments in their aid budgets to the developing countries (see Allen and Giovannetti, 2011; Esser, 2013) . In the similar argument, empirical studies showed that official aid was pro-cyclical with both donor and recipient incomes (Bulíř and Hamann, 2008) . In addition, Pallage and Robe (2001) , in a sample of 18 donors, showed that the comovements of total aid disbursements with donors' output were positive for almost threequarters of donors during 1969 to 1995.
In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, poverty-reducing initiatives across the world had led to sizable aid flows during the past decade. Official aid flow to this region excluding South Africa increased from US$13. Arief et al., 2009 ). However, some of the donor countries such as France, Iceland and Italy reduced official aid to the region due to the financial crisis (Arief et al., 2009) . Despite the total net official development assistance by Development Assistance Committee members continue to increase in real U.S. dollar terms in 2009 and 2010, the official aid for subSaharan countries still fell short of the Gleneagles' target (see Arief et al., 2009; OECD-DAC, 2011 ).
Conclusion
The channels through which the global economic and financial turmoil affects sub-Saharan African countries can be classified into direct financial and indirect real transmission channels. Direct financial channels include the effects on capital markets (such as stock markets, bonds markets, and foreign exchange markets), banking sector, and private capital flows (such as foreign direct investment and portfolio investment). Indirect real transmission channels include effects through trade, tourism, workers' remittances, and official development assistance.
While all the sub-Saharan African countries were affected by the crisis, the magnitude of the impact varies depending on the stage of the development of financial system and the structure of the economy. It is clear that some countries were highly impacted either through real contagion or financial contagion. Generally, the countries that were strongly affected by the crisis are the net exporters and those with more financially developed markets. A key source of the crisis was regulatory failure, whereby big banks and financial institutions were allowed to undertake unreasonable risks by creating sophisticated financial instruments and products for market participants. Therefore, the central banks and various regulatory authorities must be cautious about the practices of financial institutions and intermediaries in sub-Saharan
African countries. Clear rules should be provided to safeguard the effective functioning of the financial systems. To break the spillover effects and future contagion of global economic and financial crisis in the sub-Saharan African countries, it is apparent that these countries become less-dependent on key advanced and emerging market economies. While this second implication appears somewhat challenging to attain, sub-Saharan African countries may implement growth-oriented policies in order to generate growth and rein in the gains from growth. If these countries are able to plough back the gains from growth in a sustainable manner, they are bound to become less-dependent on the advanced and emerging market economies. This will subsequently help in defending these countries from external shocks such as the financial crisis. In a nutshell, we must point out that our study is exploratory in nature and may therefore not provide an accurate assessing of the impact generated by the crisis on the sub-Saharan African countries. In order to gain accurate insight, we recommend future studies to build structural models and estimated the absolute sizes of the impact of the financial crisis on these economies.
